6: Denial, Deception, and Other Forms of Flattery
The author opens with an anecdote about Batesian mimics - e.g., a fly that has the physical characteristics of a bee, which causes other creatures that might otherwise prey on it to leave it alone. That is to say that the fly borrows upon the fear of bees to defend itself, even though it has no sting.
Denial and deception (D&D) is a common tactic in business intelligence. A company that is aware that it is being spied upon will act in ways that feed false information to its competitors to thwart their efforts - to lead them to believe something is not true when it actual is, or vice-versa.
Denial. In the sense of denying access to information, is a common practice. Businesses seek to protect certain information by limiting access to it, or by non-disclosure agreements and other methods to protect trade secrets.
In the modern world, this may mean taking measures to avoid disclosing information, even when it is required. The previous example of the company that filed state-required reports with errors and omissions could be characterized as a violation of legal requirements, or it could be seen as a lack of confidence in the state's ability to safeguard the information with which it is entrusted.
Seeing Through the Wool
Even in the best of instances, information available can be vague or ambiguous, and D&D efforts can make the facts even harder to detect.
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) is a common analytical methodology, that involves developing a number of guesses and determining whether the information "fits" one more than another.
The author also provides a quick outline of the scientific method for testing a hypothesis:
- Formulate a question
- Gather evidence related to the question
- Form several possible answers to the question
- Gather data related to the answers
- Interpret the results to form a conclusion
Most importantly to ACH is that a number of answers are attempted - not just one hypothesis that "is" or "is not." It is also based largely on inference and interpretation in the absence of information, as the information itself cannot feasibly be obtained.
The author illustrates ACH in the context of a magic trick - a performer who appears to walk through a solid plate-glass window. Upon examining a video (taking time to pay attention to details a live audience would not notice), there are a number of factors that are noted that seem improbable (a clean sheet of paper being retrieved from a convenient trash can, the "office" behind the window is clearly staged and not a real office, it's in an unlikely location, and while the shot is uninterrupted, it tends to focus in on certain things at odd times.
Some of these factors are incidental (e.g., it doesn't matter if it's a "real' office behind the glass, though both seem suspicious), but other factors are not: the position of the camera, how it tightens in on certain details, and the fact that the window was obscured by a sheet of paper all point to deception: none of this would have been necessary if the performer could actually walk through the window - nor is it likely that these were random choices or mistakes, but were done purposefully to conceal.
While ACH doesn't reveal exactly how the trick was done, it does indicate a high likelihood that a "trick" is being carried out - and in terms of competitive intelligence, the first question to be answered is whether an apparent action by a competitor is a result of genuine intent, or is a "trick" meant to mislead and deflect attention from another action.
The author goes into a bit of detail about setting up an Excel spreadsheet for analysis - placing the hypotheses at the column headers, and the various bits of evidence in rows, considering whether the evidence supports each hypothesis.
When We Practice to Deceive
The author considers the tactic of the feint - it is commonplace in competitive sports and military maneuvers to "trick" an opponent into expecting one action while intending another. At best, the opponent will react to the feint, leaving them defenseless against the actual attack. Even if they don't go for it, they will be hesitant and noncommittal, and their reaction to the attack will be slowed, and the attack more effective as a result.
Beyond the immediacy of the present attack, using feints makes competitors uncertain of your future actions, and hesitant and uncertain to react to any action you take for fear that it may be a bluff. This leads to an ongoing competitive advantage, in that your rivals will be slow to react even when your intention should be obvious.
However, good deception can be costly: it takes planning, time, and resources to execute a credible feint, and an obvious feint actually gives your rival a cue to your real intentions - or at the very least, a clear indication that the action you are representing is not genuine, which undermines the value of the feint.