2.11 How Quantity Affects Population
Say begins with the typical comparison of man an animal, a fashionable practice in his time, and arrives at two key differences:
- Man is not dependent on the raw providence of nature for his survival, but is capable of acting upon nature to produce that which he requires.
- Man is capable of storing value for future consumption.
Both of these factors grant mankind a distinct advantage in survival when compared to other species, but neither is instinctual: men are quite capable of suffering from their own idleness and self-indulgence.
There are also historical instances in which vast numbers of men did so. Nature, it seems, is indifferent to the survival of any particular individual or group, though nature does tend to preserve a species as a whole, and while a vast majority of the population may perish, there generally remain sufficient survivors to repopulate in time.
Say's argument is that the population of a state is proportionate to the sum of its production - man is not dependent, as are most creatures, on raw providence. Where man produces in excess, the population grows to consume the excess.
Said another way, when any population of animals grows, the number of creatures that consumer a limited pool of resources grows, up to the point where consumption exceeds the providence of nature, and famine results to balance their numbers to the resources available. But where the ranks of mankind grows, it is not only the number of consumers that increases, but so does the number of producers and the capacity to provide for their own needs.
(EN: Say does not touch upon the Malthusian principle - that human beings must have land to produce, and that there is a theoretical maximum that the planet can sustain. But it was mentioned, in the chapter on land, that his time and even the present day there remain vast expanses of unused land, and that technology enables man to produce more with less, hence the theoretical maximum will remain, for the foreseeable future, moot.)
There have been periods in history, from the ancient Greeks to the reign of Louis XIV, where nations seemed to increase their population by making matrimony compulsory, or at least grant advantages and privileges to encourage the population to multiply - but the problem is not in getting children, but in maintaining them. A desire to increase population is often done without regard to its immediate effect: if the gross number of people in an area is increased quickly, its population will consist of many unproductive children without increasing the number of productive adults to support them.
He refers to the calculations of Messance, who investigated the population in areas that were afflicted by plagues that reduced the population, and found that in the years following such a calamity, the number of births increased dramatically. It seems that great calamites such as this have a tendency to be short-lived, and the human race has survived them often enough to recognize that they are temporary in nature.
It's further noted that such calamities tend to claim the least productive citizens: the very old and the very young are susceptible, but those who are of an age to be productive and reproductive are less affected, such that the gross reduction in number is not met in equal measure by a loss in productivity, and as such the population can restore itself relatively quickly.
The most detrimental effect on humanity is the influence of a government that acts upon poor principles of economics. At their worst, governments are a parasite upon their people, feeding on their productivity through burdensome taxation and consuming the factors of production or redirecting production to unwholesome ends. Even at their best, when governments have positive intention to the welfare of their citizens, they do great harm to economic systems by attempting to improve upon a single factor without heed to the detriment to the remainder of the system.
In regard to population specifically, the inhabitants of a nation are not deprived because their number is on the increase, nor more plentifully supplied because the population is in decline. While a smaller population would seem to have a greater share per person of the resources that can be turned to productive action, it lacks the capacity by shortage of labor to make productive those resources. Witness how common it was that populations suffered from famine during the middle ages, when there were fewer people in Europe, and the great prosperity of people during the present age, when populations have swelled.
To consider a dense population as a driver of national prosperity is to mistake cause for effect: a large number of men are more productive than a smaller number, but they are also more consumptive. If they consume more than they produce, they are not prosperous; if they produce more than they consume, they prosper. The number of individuals in question makes little difference. There is great misery in parts of India and China where human beings are in no short supply.
The situation in which men are capable of exactly the amount they require to consumer results in stability, or perhaps a happy stagnation, but there is also vulnerability: should any factor other than labor interfere with production, it will cause calamity. A nation that produces in excess can take a small loss, and may even store goods to consume in times of deprivation. One that produces exactly what it consumes has no capacity to do either.
However, it is pointed out that the capacity to consume is adjustable rather than fixed. Consider that populations can remain stable though the productivity of crops may vary from year to year: in a good year, people consume more, waste more, or trade the surplus for luxury; in a bad year, people consume less (but not so much less that starvation ensues), are frugal to avoid waste, and forego luxury. It takes a severe shortage for people to perish from hunger.
Commerce in general facilitates the exchange of products, whether it is between neighbors or remote countries: each provides to the other something he wants but does not produce for himself. The wants of man are driven not only by his needs, but by his desires - such that some may trade a necessity (food) for a luxury (jewelry) and the producers of luxuries may have their basic needs fulfilled without producing the specific item needed.
It is suggested that those nations or persons who produces only luxuries, or produces "too much" luxury, are at greater risk and dependent on trade with those that produce necessities. A global crisis that resulted in insufficient food would have a lesser impact on those who produce necessities - who could consumer rather than trade their product - than those who produce luxuries - whose needs are not met by the inventory at hand. This theory is entirely sound, but entirely moot given that a crisis of this scale is unheard of and highly unlikely.
Say considers the example of Britain, itself an island and highly dependent on trade. The population has swelled and the domestic industry has shifted in recent centuries from agriculture to manufacturing and industry to such an extent that the population would starve if the island were blockaded. Britain is in a precarious position, and has invested significantly in military (particularly naval) resources to protect maritime trade.
By contrast, France has maintained agriculture in sufficient amount to provide for its own needs, and an even larger population, and is much more secure against the prospect of threat. The cost of this security has been the progress and prosperity of the people: they produce low-value goods, and the condition of the French peasant is cruder and less comfortable than that of the English peasant \n terms of the quantity and quality of goods they daily enjoy.
Say lists a number of conditions that he has witnessed in areas of France that remain depressed: the lack of investment in production (land is not improved and structures such as livestock enclosures are not constructed), the indolence of producers (fields are choked with weeds and insects and moss destroy some portion of the crops), and effective methods of cultivation are not employed (the practices of the farmer have changed little since the middle ages even though technology has advanced). He also notes the great capacity of the French for self-indulgence, the "unthrifty and unprofitable" way in which any surplus is wasted on prodigality and "injurious modes of consumption" or even on pursuits that lead to no human value at all.
There is enormous potential for man to improve his lot, though he seems pleased to be indolent and seek to achieve a level of production that is "just sufficient to vegetate upon" and shuns opportunities where just a little bit of effort would improve his lot. Here, Say briefly mentions that this quality in an entire nation of men is likely due to an external force that has been so long detrimental to "the spirit of inquiry and improvement" that such values as judgment, perseverance, and frugality have been lost to their way of life.
(EN: This seems to me a question of cultural values. The notion of self-improvement and the drive for material possessions is a value of western culture that is not universally shared, even in western nations. There are some who do not value having one iota more than they need, and who define the quality of life as having more time than things. So long as they can produce enough to persist without becoming parasitic, it is harmful to none but themselves.)
In sum, population is proportionate to production, which may vary from person to person, town to town, and nation to nation. The prosperity of a people depends on both their interest in being productive and the means at their disposal to produce - and where a society fails to flourish it may be both or either that is deficient, and in this regard the particulars must be considered as no generalization will maintain.
Density of Population
It has been suggested that, due to the desire of man to apply himself to the most productive opportunities, that people tend to cluster in areas where the natural resources are most conducive to production: agricultural communities emerge in fertile valleys.
There is also the benefit of mere colocation as a matter of commerce: men seek to live near to one to expedite cooperation and trade: a miller seeks to situate himself close to the grain-farmer, but so does the blacksmith whose product is in no-way related to the supply of raw materials, but the supply of customers for his finished goods.
Say speaks to "the charms of town life" as deriving from the collective value consumers can obtain in a location where producers are closely situated and, correspondingly, the gathering of customers in one location is of value to the merchant. Hence we find many professions located in a town that do not exist in remote areas of the back country.
Some calculations have been done to suggest that a thriving country can support in its towns a population equal to that of the country, though Say views these calculations with some suspicion. The number of people seems less significant than their productivity, such that in a place where the land is fertile and the farmers have much to trade, it would be feasible for the number of townsmen to exceed the number of farmers.
Say considers ancient Greece, where there were very people residing very small towns when compared to the population of the countryside, in contrast to his own age, when towns are larger and more populous. He also considers the trade caravans and fairs, which were unusual events that brought to a region items they did not produce locally - the permanence of merchants offering the same wares in towns on a regular basis is a result of increased productivity.
The manufacturing industry has also given rise to many towns. A location that is well situated to the mass production of one good (a nail-factory is proximate to a mine) attracts a producer who is in need of a number of laborers, and the needs of those laborers attract merchants who offer the things they may need (food, clothing, and the like). In some instances, the goods may be imported, in others, it is simply more advantageous (or necessary) to produce them locally: the tailor and the barber must set up shop where their customers reside.
But more to the point, it is a specific quality of agriculture than disperses population, as a small number of men must work a large expanse of land to produce a given amount. Improvements in agriculture have decreased the need for dispersion, and manufacturing enables many to be productive in a smaller amount of space. As such, Say is less alarmed than others seem to be at the shift of the population from farms to towns: it is a matter of evolution in technology and productivity that men may create greater value in less area.
There is also the natural balance of supply and demand: if there were not a surplus of food to trade for manufactured goods, manufacturing towns would not have sprung up. And should the balance shift such that food becomes scarce, then the migration would occur in the opposite direction, the profit of producing food increasing to attract more producers due to its scarcity.
He also considers the condensation of value in goods - how agricultural products have very little value for their weight as compared to manufactured goods. For example, a clock weighing less than a pound is equal in value to several tons of grain.
Looking again to his native France, he remarks that there are many provinces that are "miserable enough" that would be encouraged to higher cultivation by the institution of towns, as a means to supply things that could be purchased by greater agricultural productivity of which men are clearly capable. He acknowledges that this becomes a chicken-and-egg argument, whether establishing a town would make farmers more productive, or greater productivity of farmers would cause a town to be established. It does seem logical that it could work in either direction, or both at once.
He does acknowledge that planning for the establishment of a town is pointless if there is insufficient industry in an area to support it. No whim of a king can create a great city if there is no need for one, and while capital can furnish the means to lay roads and erect buildings, they will be vacant and unused until they fall to ruin. He concedes the American city of Washington was erected on vacant land, but it was not will alone that caused it to become a metropolis, but proximity to trade routes and harbors that were of immediate service in the exploration of the bounty of the fledgling nation.
The converse is also true: the city of Paris continued to increase in defiance of regulations issued by the government to limit its growth. The consequence of these regulations was overcrowding, in that the force of law had great success in limiting construction of buildings to house the growing population, but did not deter the growth of population. And the result was great misery: the inconvenience and inefficiency of moving goods and people through crowded streets, the hazards of overflowing sewers and crowded quarters, and the like. Even so, people seem to consider the inconveniences to be outweighed by the benefits of living in such extreme proximity.