2: The Consular Republic
The Consulate shows that the work of a powerful individual is superior to that of a collective: Bonaparte immediately replaced the bloody chaos that had perpetuated for ten years of a republic and set France on a stable course - a task that none of the four assemblies of the revolution had been unable to realize was thus accomplished under a single leader in short order.
Retuning to the psychology of crowds, crowds represent potential to do something and are desperate for direction. And in that sense all of France had been as a great crowd, accepting the leadership of anyone who was able to provoke it. But to take lasting control of the crowd, direction must be clear and consistent - which is exactly what Bonaparte, accustomed to leading an army, was capable of doing.
How the Work of the Revolution Was Confirmed by the Consulate
That is to say that he replaced unorganized collective despotism with a perfectly organized individual despotism - such that rather than a perpetual struggle among factions to obtain control, there was an immediate resolution that placed control in the hands of one, who had a singular purpose. While he remained despotic, there was perfect clarity and certainty of direction.
The ideals of the revolution and the republic were not abandoned, and much of Bonaparte's government retained them and made effective the resolutions that were derived from it - the abolition of privileges for the nobility, equality of citizens before the law, and other key principles were no longer merely spoken about, but acted upon.
There follows a bit of speculation as to whether monarchy might have been restored - and it certainly seems plausible, but anyone who came to power would have been unable to undo the greater part of the work of the revolution - the people simply would not have stood for it. So instead, any leader would have been compelled to do as Bonaparte did: to respect the principles of the revolution and establish them in laws and customs. Had anyone done otherwise, there would have been a stern reaction and a return to revolution.
One cannot say that Bonaparte was not a tyrant, but merely that his tyranny had been less odious than that of the monarchy and republic before him. The people of a nation are less concerned with the format of their government, democracy or despotism, as they are with the manner in which it impacts their personal welfare.
The Reorganization Of France by the Consulate
When Bonaparte assumed power, France was in ruins - both figuratively and literally. The revolutionary assemblies had left the people in a state of chaos, and their neglect of the infrastructure left workplaces abandoned and roads and bridges crumbling from neglect and the ravages of armed conflicts.
The day after he took power, he "almost single-handed" rewrote the constitution to give himself absolute power to reorganize the nation and disband the actions, which was effected within a month.
The terms of this constitution gave the "first consul," which was Bonaparte himself, absolute power, and appointed two other consuls in a strictly advisory capacity. He appointed ministers, ambassadors, and other officials in the manner that a general officer would assign duties to his subordinates. And while a number of assemblies were created (the council of state, the tribune, the legislative corps, and the senate) they were clearly subordinated to the first counsel, who had the exclusive power to initiate laws.
While Bonaparte would constantly consult with the other consuls, even for the most trivial measures, they did not exercise much influence during his reign, and the same could be said of his assemblies. There would be open discussion of matters of state, and there has been some argument over how much input he permitted others to have, and whether he ceded to the will of an assembly or merely pretended to do so when their decision suited his preferences, but there is little doubt that he alone ratified the final decisions.
This is not to say that the assemblies of the government were disregarded, as Bonaparte had staffed them with eminent jurists - but he was wise enough to recognize that a large assembly of competent individuals was capable of ludicrous incompetence when acting as a whole, which had been shown during the whole of the revolution.
It's also observed that the people had little part in their government: they had been permitted to vote but once - in approving the constitution. The representatives of the people were selected rather than elected, and on the rare occasion a vote was organized, it was more in the nature of an opinion poll. It is speculated that the people, who had once demanded a voice in their government, had been convinced by ten years of suffering that they would be better off having no voice, so long as those to whom they ceded all authority would maintain tranquility and order.
Psychological Elements that Contributed to the Success of the Consulate
The laws of nature constrain the actions of men in few ways, and for the most part the external forces that constrain the actions of men and define his environment are simply the actions of other men - which is to say, that psychology plays a large part in shaping the situation in which men find themselves.
Top be effective as a ruler, one must understand the psychology of a nation. The revolutionary assemblies were completely ignorant of this, whereas Bonaparte seemed to understand it instinctively. He recognized what men would be willing and able to do, given their nature and the environment, and considered this in his directives.
He recognized the importance of remaining aloof from the conflicting parties, to consider them as influences on the mind of the people - but recognized that falling in with any of them would have been a mistake. Instead, he devoted himself to the principles of the revolution, and chose from the more granular ideals and plans of the parties that were best suited to the achievement of those principles. Neither did he seek to completely alienate those members of the old regime, but instead sought to employ them in support of his new government.
One of the more remarkable feats was the restoration of religious peace - as the people of France were far more divided by their religious disagreements than political differences. His approach was simply to disarm the church - to give to the clergy the ability to lead their congregations, but withhold from them the ability to extend their leadership beyond those congregations. That is not to say that the clergy was independent of the sate, as all Bishops were selected and appointed by Bonaparte - and it was thus subordinated to the state and relegated to very specific and limited powers. To allow religion to run rampant would have been to create a competing government, as sure as to allow the revolutionary clubs to have retained their powers.
It is also remarked that Bonaparte did not employ much military force to bring the nation to order. While there were still many departments in a state of insurrection, bands of brigands marauding the nation, and struggles among groups of partisans, his approach to bringing them into line was more diplomatic than military: rather than combatting them, be used finesse and firmness to bring them into line with his own ideas.
Here, Le Bon returns to polemic regarding historians whose depiction of the events of the revolution are more fiction than fact - and remarks that it is a wonder "how intelligent men could so misjudge a period of history ... because they saw events through their own convictions, and we know what transformations the truth may suffer for a man who is imprisoned in the valley of belief."