6: The Armies of the Revolution
The Revolutionary Assemblies and the Armies
In spite of the internal chaos of France during the years after the revolution, it had significant military victories against foreign powers during that time and had increased its territories in Europe significantly.
This had little to do with the assemblies and the convention, as these bodies were weak and unfocused, changing its course daily according to impulse. Instead, the assembly abandoned all military questions to a committee, which was directed almost single-handedly by Carnot.
The duty of this committee was logistics: to furnish the 752,000 members of the state militia with provisions and ammunition - but it also advised the general officers and in doing so directed the military as a whole.
It was believed at the time that France was faced with many enemies along her boarders, and that the surrounding states would take advantage of the weakened state of the nation to invade. For the most part, the army was engaged in defending the borders, particularly along the east, and was seldom engaged in the internal troubles of the time.
There were instances in which the assembly sought to take direct control of the military, particularly to menace them in the same way as they terrorized the public, but they soon recognized that sending armed thugs to assassinate a general who was surrounded by armed troops was a much more difficult matter than terrorizing unarmed civilians, and did not interfere much.
For the most part, the army directed itself, and aside of encouragement and a vague sense of direction, they operated independently of the convention.
The Struggle of Europe Against the Revolution
Prior to the revolution, the foreign sovereigns in Europe regarded France as a rival power - but as the revolution took shape, they recognized that their support of the French monarchy was critical to maintaining the legitimacy of their own rule, and to prevent a similar uprising at home.
The threat they posed to France was more in the nature of helping Louis XVI return to power. For example, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria had agreed to help restore the French monarchy in exchange for certain territories.
The armies of the revolution showed significant skill in battle against its neighboring forces, and in many cases recaptured territories, such as Belgium, which France had ceded in previous conflicts and thus were welcomed as liberators in the territories they conquered.
By 1793 the tone of international politics changed - England, Prussia, and Austria formally resolved to "dismember" France, and the Spaniards, while not part of this pact, nonetheless sought to expand their influence into French territories. The rhetoric of these negotiations, which threated to "exterminate the whole of the party directing the nation" only focused the fear of the assembly and created a strong support of military defense.
Le Bon details some of the successes and failures of the French military campaigns, as well as those of her enemies who "never put their whole heart into the affair" and were preoccupied with other matters. History greatly aggrandizes and glorifies the military campaigns.
But the critical factors are that the French army was far too concerned with its campaigns against foreign powers to involve themselves in sorting out the domestic squabbles - and after deposing the old regime have very little to do with the new.
Psychological Factors that Effected Military Success
The state of the French army was in reality quite miserable - the troops were "ragged and often barefoot," deprived and quite literally staving. Yet they maintained a high level of enthusiasm and tolerance for discomfort by virtue of being steeped in the principles of the revolution. They believed themselves to be the guarantors of this new religion that was destined to regenerate the world.
Le Bon likens the French army to that of Arabia, who began as dispersed tribes of nomads but, under the fanaticism of Islam, transformed themselves into formidable armies that conquered the Middle East, northern Africa, and much of Asia. The same sort of faith enabled the French army, enamored of the ideals of the new republic, to band together and sustain their sense of unity and purpose.
The military was not an instrument of the government, but an independent body driven by belief in the ideals of the revolution - in a different manner, and with greater fidelity, than the legislation and revolutionary clubs that often used the ideals as propaganda while pursuing baser motives.
It's also noted that the faith of the revolution was contagious, and many of those whom the army conquered gladly met them - they were welcomed as heroes in towns that they liberated, who had previously been "bent under the yoke of absolute monarchy." This fueled the morale of the army.
Religious wars are often marked by this level of enthusiasm, such that the soldiers had no doubt in their cause or their leaders. But neither are religious wars particularly honorable, as widespread destruction and mass slaughter result when there is no respect for the basic human dignity of an enemy who is considered contemptible for his heresy.
A few accounts are given in which the French army wiped entire cities from the map - executing the entire population, leveling buildings, and devastating the fields. It was not with the same wanton brutality with which the armed gangs of the Jacobin factions inflicted terror on the citizens of France, but a rather grim and sober demeanor - thought its effects were ultimately similar.
The faith and enthusiasm among the rank and file was channeled by generals who were remarkable in terms of their military competence and charisma. Many of the leaders of the republican army had been nobles before, and had experience and training in military manner, but others rose from the rank and file.
There were many youthful leaders, who had great enthusiasm and ambition, and who came to power in a situation in which they required the support of their soldiers, rather than having been appointed by an authority. They well understood that their leadership relied on maintaining the support and morale of their followers.
Le Bon returns to his ideas of crowd psychology, and asserts that an army is also a kind of crowd, subject to irrational impulse, and directed entirely by their leadership. A military unit is unlike an impromptu mob in that its leaders are established and they focus the energy of the crowd on very specific results.
A consistency of leaders also creates a consistency of purpose: a crowd is at the whim of anyone among its membership who makes a suggestion, whereas an army's established generals must act in a consistent manner and give specific orders in order to retain the support of the troops.
In sum, an army is an organized and disciplined crowd, which is what makes it effective, and the psychology of the army can be fashioned by its leaders and directed in a specific manner. It is leadership that differentiates an army from a barbarian horde or a riotous mob - and the requirements of leading an army prevented it from becoming one.