3: The Psychology of the Convention
(EN: The National Convention replaced the legislative assembly in 1792 and lasted about three years - it was the first elected government of the new regime.)
The Legend of the Convention
The struggles of the convention have been so aggrandized and fictionalized by historian that the accounts of this period are more legendary than factual. The central figures, often called "the giants of the convention" are portrayed as heroes or supermen, and the epithet of "giant" seems all the more appropriate, more because of their similarity to creatures of mythology than to the grandness of their actions.
It is only recently (to the author's time) that the historical records of the time are being discovered and scrutinized to disentangle this legend and arrive at a more plausible depiction of events. We see their motives as more base than they have been depicted, and for all their inspirational speeches about ideas such as liberty and equality, they ruled by threat and fear, often seeking to aggregate power to themselves.
The fact that they perpetrated most of their crimes upon the former enemies of the people, the nobility and the clergy, has led them to be romanticized, but their behavior was entirely abominable - it was merely directed at a foe whom the people wished to see punished, and so they were supportive of it.
Le Bon insists that, in considering the men of the convention individually we will find they did not possess any exception amount of intelligence, virtue, or courage - and were in many respects no better, and little different, from the central figures who had previously supported the monarchy. A few, perhaps, deserved the title of "genius" for their intellect - but again, the noble ideas that decorated speeches were very rarely the basis for action.
The legend of the convention reflects the posturing of the time - of communications and speeches that spoke boldly when there was little threat of opposition. The fact of the convention is that it was "slavishly obedient to the orders of the club," "trembling before the popular delegations which invaded it daily," and "obeying the injunctions of rioters."
In all, the convention provides a perfect example of the failings of popular government, who for fear of the mob would ratify legislation that was "so absurd that it was obliged to annul them as soon as the rioters quitted the hall."
Results of the Triumph of the Jacobin Religion
It has been asserted that political revolutions are not based on reason, but on mysticism, and in that sense the French Revolution is not the triumph of reason but that of myths, a secular religion designed by the Jacobins whose dogma was imposed upon the masses by means of the threat of violence.
The ideas of the return to nature, the rights of man, socialism, hatred of tyrants, and the will of the masses were doctrines that were to be accepted without argument - and which were so vague and self-contradictory that they could be configured to justify the whim of the moment - and the extermination of any dissenters.
The public policy derived from this religion was very simple: it was a dictatorship that would tolerate no opposition, and more tyrannical than the monopoly it had been formulated to depose. To the Jacobins, their directives were to be obeyed without objection, and citizens had no right to refuse. They showed little reluctance to seize property and imprison or execute any who opposed them.
It is noted that the Jacobins were never in majority among the people, but merely possessed the force to impose their will on the masses. Their ranks were estimated to be about five thousand in Paris (a city of 700,000), less than 300 in Besancon (a city of 300,000) and likely less than 300,000 in all of France.
They are described as "a small feudality of brigands" who dominated the country. In practical terms, they did this by terrorizing civilians - which was not particularly difficult because the peasantry who had been terrorized into obedience to the monarchy simply perpetuated this behavior under a new master. They also had some vague connection to the government, so it was believed that whatever they did was with the authority of the state. And finally, it was believed by many that if the Jacobins were resisted, the old regime would regain control.
It's noted that the Jacobins did finally lose power when they had gone too far, and when the people viewed them as an enemy to liberty. This is a demonstration of the principle that those who would oppress men depend heavily on the cooperation of the oppressed - and when the oppressed cease to cooperate in sufficient numbers their power is discovered to be an illusion.
Mental Characteristics of the Convention
The convention shared most of the characteristic of the constituent and legislative assemblies before it. Le Bon insists that it did so in an exaggerated form.
The body of the assembly was strongly influenced by political clubs that terrorized the general population: only about one in seven citizens voted in the elections. The result of this was that the assembly was factionalized, with the Girondist and Montangard factions controlling about 100 seats apiece, and constitutional monarchists "had almost disappeared."
The factions within the convention eventually turned on one another, and the Montangard faction triumphed: of the 180 Girondist representatives who led the convention, 140 were killed or fled. Of the remaining representatives, they showed themselves as little as possible in the assembly, and sessions of the convention often contained barely a third of the representatives.
The 500 remaining members, generally referred to as "the plain" were "a floating mass, silent, undecided, and timid" which generally followed or on the two main factions. As such the convention was "constantly led by a violent minority of narrow minds" that effectively controlled the majority.
While this majority exercised little influence over the decisions of the convention, it was often the source of "technical committees" to which the more useful work was dedicated, as the Montaignard factionalists lacked the intelligence or experience to actually get things done. That is to say that the majority had little input into decisions, but bore the responsibility of tending to the details necessary to articulate and execute them.
From a psychological perspective, the theme of the convention was one of "horrible fear" that drove men to support the minority of terrorists. Le Bon asserts that "men cut off one another's heads in the hope of keeping their own." It was not merely a vague sense of dread, but had a very specific cause: armed partisans would invade the sessions "at every moment" such that the majority of members avoided even attending, and avoided speaking when they did attend, for fear of an immediate reprisal. The majority "voted for everything they were ordered to vote for" by the minority.
Robespierre, as the leader of the Montaignard faction, "reigned alone over a terrified crowd of servile representatives." It is remarked that he was also largely motivated by fear of reprisal: he had used his power to murder and brutalize his political opponents, which meant that such a power existed for anyone who could seize the majority, which meant that he could find himself on the wrong side of this arrangement if someone else gained power.