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3 Man's Wants

Man's needs can be considered quite simply by recognizing those things without which he would perish: air to breathe, liquid to drink, food to eat, clothing and shelter from the elements, treatment when he is ill, and the like - though there are a myriad of solutions to each of his needs - so he cannot be said to need a specific thing, and in many cases he desires more than his needs strictly require.

However, it is likely impossible and would be quite pointless to attempt to prevent a complete catalog of all the things man might want, as his capacity to want is infinite. The suggestion of what a man ought to want is a matter of great conjecture - and a great amount of time is wasted in pursuit of such a list. We can observe what man does want, but any further elaboration becomes argument.

He grows a bit philosophical about wants - the lack of something causes pain, therefore suffering can be seen as a positive force that motivates men to achieve because if it weren't for fear of pain we would spend our days idle. (EN: I think he is back to his polemic against socialism, which proposes every desire of man be fulfilled without requiring effort on his part. But it goes on rather a while and adds little to the subject.)

Needs are necessary for the preservation of the body - wants are necessary to achieve more than that. Bastiat "certainly" recognizes that the "moral improvement" of the species is perceived as being of greater importance than the vulgar physical requirements of the body - but they are not necessary to survival. Suggestions to the contrary are in the domain of religion, which is neither capable of nor subject to rational discussion.

He dallies a bit more on the topic of morality, which often requires an individual to do things that are harmful to himself in order to benefit others or achieve spiritual goals. Furthermore fashion and religion often portray as base the desire for material success. Such opinions are better matter for sermons than discussions of economics.

In the natural order of things, survival is not a sin and pleasure is not a vice. And while it is fashionable to consider intellectual and spiritual pursuits as being superior to the baser material needs, these base needs must be satisfied before "higher" goals may be considered. No scholar or priest has ever lasted long without food, as disdainful as they may be about the matter of eating.

Bastiat stays in this trench for quite some time - ultimately returning to his original point: that the difference between a want and a need is that the latter is necessary for survival. And anything more than bare survival is a luxury, which includes intellectualism, fashion, religion, and morality. These are the wants of men whose basic survival needs have been met.

Needs are felt to differing degrees by different men, based on the things to which they are accustomed. A workman may find himself perfectly happy in humble clothing and living in a modest home, whereas a wealthier man may find the same clothing and accommodations unpleasant. As it happens, men generally tend to progress and grow more successful and wealthier through their lives, and the things wanted (not needed) for their comfort continually increase in their number and quality.

And even as man progresses, he is forever jealous of his neighbors - and seems to grow dissatisfied with the things that once kept him perfectly content when he notices that someone else has something more or better. For this reason, man's capacity for want is infinite and incapable of being permanently satisfied. The notion that man's existence is constant progression to consuming more and more is not necessarily true. It is what drives us forward, but many are pleased to remain at a given station in life, and others can adjust to a setback, albeit with some complaint - but we do tend to be driven to increase our wants.

He backs off a bit from this, as proximity does not always create jealousy and can in some instances have a forming effect: a "society" is a group of people who choose to behave in a similar manner, which includes their manner of consumption. So in effect a man may seek to match those of his same culture or class as a matter of fitting into his station in life. And again, these are wants rather than needs - across all cultures, man has the same needs to preserve his life.

Just as we are motivated to act in order to avoid pain, so are we motivated to act in order to gain pleasure - and while some would denounce pleasure-seeking as immoral, there would be little for us to do without this motivation. It is not that man wants that makes him moral or immoral, although the methods by which he seeks to satisfy those wants are subject to that judgment.

He also notes that the pursuit of wants can also be taken too far. "We are suffering from overproduction" it is said, and far too much time is spent in the busyness of producing and consuming. But idle time itself is a want, and when man overproduces he chooses the other items he earns in lieu of the luxury of time.

While economics often focuses on the material things, the reason these things exists is because they are necessary as the means to satisfy the wants and needs of men.

Next question: by what means may man address his wants and needs?

Nature provides very little that is in a state that is ready for consumption, but a great bounty of resources that, with labor, may be fashioned into serviceable goods. We must labor to produce wealth, but those who assert that labor alone creates wealth overlook the necessity of something to labor upon. But it is generally true that labor is necessary to produce wealth from nature, as things are not often available in a state of readiness for consumption but must be worked upon.

He (tediously) considers the basic needs of man. Breathing is easily satisfied without effort, as we are well provided of air. Thirst is a bit more difficult, as water is plentiful but must be fetched and gathered. Food is more difficult still, because edibles are sparse in the wilderness and much work must be done to gather it. Clothing and shelter are less plentiful in nature still, as the materials provided must be adapted to suit their purposes. Beyond that, nature provides very little without great effort to gather and fashion.

He strays a bit into the political again: two men placed in identical environments, endowed with the same gifts of nature, will quickly diverge in the wealth they amass according to the labor they apply to making use of what they are provided. The same can be said of villages and nations. Prosperity is easier given material to work upon, but an abundance of natural resources does not guarantee prosperity. One may witness great prosperity of a people who live on largely barren earth, and great desperation of those who are provided of much by their environments.

He focuses momentarily on nature, which puts two things and man's disposal: materials and forces. Materials are understood easily enough, as they are visible and tangible objects. Forces are often invisible or at least go unnoticed in their natural state - until a windmill or water wheel is erected, the forces of nature are not readily perceived. Forces are used to substitute for human labor - though some labor is necessary to harness them and put them to use.

Most men, in most instances, seek the easier path - though this is not universally practiced. In general, men will choose the option that requires the least effort to achieve the same outcome. Though some may stubbornly choose the more difficult path. Otherwise, we can generally observe that man's wealth increases as his labors decrease. It is precisely because the "gifts" of nature come to us in such an ill-suited manner that labor is necessary at all.

He ponders, momentarily, the obsession with the materiality of things. It is necessary, but entirely secondary. A thing is not of value because it exists, but because it renders an immaterial benefit. And the notion that man "makes" things is hubris - he merely rearranges the material that is provided by nature. The value is not in the matter, but the benefit it provides as a consequence of being rearranged.

He goes back to socialism, which maintains that the producers, businessmen, and merchants render no value because they do not "make" anything - but then, neither does their beloved working class. Those who work with material merely reshape it to suit a purpose. The producer instructs them in how to shape it, and without his instruction their labor is of no use. The merchant transports their wares to the customer, and were it not so then no benefit would be rendered. The financier enables them to have material to work upon, without which their motions would yield no benefit.

The very concept of "labor" is vague, and is often misconstrued to mean only "the muscular activity of men working with material things." But physical effort is merely derived from intellectual effort required to determine how material things may be created to solve human wants. Moreover, the material things are incidental - it is possible to create a benefit without material at all. Great value is created, but no material object conveyed, when a professor instructs students or a surgeon operates upon a patient.

Here, he lapses again into moralizing over the balance of a man's wants against the effort he is willing to undertake to satisfy them. Man's greatest problem is an unrestrained appetite for both benefits and inertia. He craves to have everything he desires but to do nothing to create it. This is both the alluring promise of socialism, and the very reason it can never work.

In terms of equality, no two men will be equal in their wealth unless they are also equal in their productiveness - though it is not merely busying oneself with activity, but choosing the right activity to produce what is wanted. But for that matter, men are not equal in their wants: "what one man treasures, another despises." We are satisfied by different things, and choose to pursue different things. Society is merely a venue in which we can collaborate when our interests are aligned.

He then levels a criticism at Adam Smith, in that Smith was obsessed about the material objects created by production rather than the desires that those objects might satisfy. As such, Smith's theory directs the reader to a pointless productivity, of things that are not wanted and in quantities that are not needed, as a virtue. Man is not served by the accumulation of things, but the satisfaction of his desires.

As a result, Economists of the British school are concerned exclusively with the interests of the producer, whereas those of the French school are concerned primarily with the needs of the consumer - and as such seek to produce nothing that is not desired.