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13: Man as merely rational

One of the primary weaknesses of philosophy is in its consideration of man as being "merely intellectual," and driven at all times by the careful application of his rational faculty. At the time these arguments were made, so much more was being discovered (arguably - people knew that "things fall" well before Newton quantified it mathematically, so this isn't so much a matter of discovery as observation of what was already known) that contributes to the ability of mankind to make better judgments that, in future, man will be guided by perfect knowledge and perfect reason.

Malthus is willing to concede that every voluntary act is preceded by a decision of the mind - but whether that decision is well-made or guided at all by reason is strongly in doubt. Man deliberates over few decisions, and tends to act impulsively in most circumstances, applying a minimum of knowledge and effort rather than careful considerations, going by superficial observations rather than careful analysis, seeking to achieve immediate satisfaction rather than an outcome that would be better for the long run.

This leads, in a roundabout way, to another round of deliberation over a political rather than economic topic: punishment of an individual by society for his choice to take actions detrimental to society at large. Execution is "much too frequent" (in the author's time), and the lesser forms of punishment involve in some way the "restraint or removal of an individual member whose vicious habits are likely to be prejudicial to society."

Godwin suggests that imprisonment, while expedient, has very little value as the offender is little improved by time in solitude or in the company of his fellow reprobates, and would be more likely reformed if given to the company of able and virtuous men from whose example he might learn. A fine point, but not a remedy, as crime tends to flourish when there is no consequence at all for it.

(EN: This is a matter of some debate, and the contemporary view of governmental reaction to individuals involves a number of justifications, which include: [1] compelling an individual to make restitution to those he has harmed [2] punishing an individual to discourage him from continuing in his behavior [3] punishing an individual to discourage others from imitating his behavior [4] eliminating an individual who poses a threat to society [by past of anticipated future actions] by simply removing him, whether by execution, banishment, or imprisonment [5] to appease the emotional distress of his victims of their families and thus prevent ongoing feuds over disputes. It's a much more complex topic than Malthus presently considers, and likely a distraction from the main topic, to which the author does not return.)