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Appendix: Interviews from the Book

(EN: The authors concluded each chapter with one or more lengthy interviews - which provided a first-person perspective on some of the topics covered, but which was also largely redundant and oblique to the authors' own discussion. As such, I've removed them from each chapter, relegated them to this appendix, and preserved only bullet points.)

Sachio Semmoto (Chapter 1)

The authors interview Dr. Sachio Semmoto, a college professor who founded eAccess, Japan's first DSL internet access provider, and alter eMobile, a 3G mobile data network.

Government involvement in data networks is desirable because it is a common resource to so many businesses that it merits public control.
One of the weaknesses of the Japanese model is that the mobile spectrum is carved up among a few major players and newcomers are largely shut out.
US government, prior to 2000, and particularly the leadership of the FCC created an environment hostile to collaboration
What's holding the US market back today is a weak economy: after a brief period of growth, the financial meltdown occurred. He expects that as the country recovers, it will experience growth in the mobile sector.
He sees excellent potential in China where many small start-up companies working in the mobile space, but there is some threat of government intrusion, especially in terms of the weak defense of intellectual property. Aside of that, they are poised to be at "the forefront of global technical innovation
India is also a large market with significant potential, though they have government problems of their own and tend to take a more western, competitive perspective.
Perhaps the most important consumer issue is price: mobile is still too expensive for many in developing economies and even those in industrialized nations restrict their usage
Various attempts have been made to simplify cellular pricing, but experiments with a one-price-for-all approach have met with failure. Consumers generally prefer a tiered pricing plan based on access, and a cheaper price even if it means restrictions on usage.
The greatest potential for growth in the mobile industry right now to be the replacement of landline phones with cellular phones.
Presently, the majority of interest in mobile is on the service side rather than the infrastructure side. Improving infrastructure is a huge investment by comparison, and not feasible for small entrepreneurial firms to undertake.

Takeshi Natsuno (Chapter 2)

Notes from an interview with Takeshi Natsuno, another college professor who was formerly an executive at NTT DoCoMo in charge of business strategy for multimedia services.

Mobile is perceived as "multimedia services on top of a telecom platform," which are two entirely different things
Infrastructure specialists are inured in the technical workings, and "can never" provide content that is appealing to the user - they msut take the perspective of providing a platform and a network and leave content to those more capable of delivering it.
Ironically, this is exactly the situation in the West: all of the major players in the mobile space are software firms such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft rather than telecom firms, and they are leading innovation in the mobile industry. It seems "strange" that the carriers in the west never did show much interest.
Japan was first in mobile because of standardization and cooperation: it is too small a market to be carved up among competing firms with entirely different ecosystems - to succeed, the simply had to work together and define common ground.
Another reason for mobile's success is "Nobody seriously believed that mobile multimedia services could generate high profits" - no-one had the resources to develop a robust set of features or a do-everything system: each could make only small services that could be scaled and combined.
This is again in contrast to the western approach, in which the major players are rolling out 100% proprietary systems that do not play nicely with one another. The drawback to this approach is the necessity of making significant investment in a large and robust system that is entirely self-contained, rather than building and leveraging smaller components incrementally.
The same situation is also discouraging to entrepreneurs, who must contend with the oligopoly of firms who control the services customers may obtain - there is little opportunity for revenue, and little incentive for investment.
Ironically, the big providers - Google, Microsoft, and Apple - voice the same complaints about device manufacturers and service providers. They feel that they are limited in what they can provide by the device itself - a weak Web browser, throttled bandwidth, etc.
Another problem of oligopoly is lack of opportunity: because services must be developed for a specific system, the developer an capture a small segment of the consumer market - and what works on one "version" of a device may not work on the next. As such, the potential for success is small and the threat to business continuity is significant - it's no wonder few firms are willing to invest much in such a situation.
As such, the conversation in the western telecommunication industry these days is all about standardization, and innovation is taking a back seat. "They are all waiting for standardization to arrive"
In general, 10 million users of a given platform is taken as the benchmark for "critical mass" that makes it a target worth developing for.
For infrastructure providers, the emerging markets are more attractive than advanced ones: there are enormous possibilities where competition is thin and few people have mobile devices. But to succeed, this requires a heavy investment in infrastructure and a bundle of services that will be appealing to the target market.
Emerging markets also provide opportunity for innovation that does not exist in established markets: you can pick one technology and go with it, take it as far as it can be taken. For this reason, when mobile enters those markets, it will be vastly more advanced and capable than it is in established ones.
There is also the benefit of consumer acceptance: a customer who has nothing gladly accepts what is offered, so there is no competition to wean customers away from a different service.
Mobile banking is currently a major draw to emerging markets: few people have much money, and there is no banking infrastructure with branch offices in remote locations. It's catching on in a big way in parts of Africa.
Another drawback in established markets is that established players seek to comfortably extend their services from one channel to another, porting the full capabilities of their Internet presence to a mobile device, where it is extremely awkward. This in the third world have simple needs, and services can be pared down and stripped of unnecessary complexity to be made usable to them. This is among the chief reasons that those in industrialized nations cannot simply extend their network and devices to include the third world - they are not a good fit for consumer needs.
The same is true, even of consumers in established countries: they find mobile awkward and difficult due to user-interface issues. They do not want or need the full complexity of the Internet in their pocket, yet this is what they are being offered.
"The best conclusion would be for those in the telecom industry to focus their time and attention listening to the real voices of their consumers and not in countless meetings discussing international standards. Mobile industry executives always like to think that the telecommunications industry is leading the changes in people's lifestyles. In reality, this belief is so far away from what the actual users are thinking."
Mobile agents are "the next big area for innovation" - analogous to an executive secretary or a personal assistant who helps them to deal with the distracting but necessary tasks of daily life.
Many companies have huge databases of customer information, but still are unable to leverage this data to get a clear sense of an individual's lifestyle - even if they were to look at the information they have, they can perceive only those behaviors that involve a data transaction.
The example is given of McDonald's in Japan, a business that does largely cash transactions and cannot "see" its customers. By using digital payment systems and electronic promotions and coupons, it can gain information it is presently unable to perceive.

Tom Moss (Chapter 2)

Notes from an interview with Tom Moss, the head of the Asia Pacific New Business Development for Google, specifically the partnerships and operations for the Android platform.

Moss insists Android is "much larger than just a Google initiative," but is the product of an Open Handset Alliance that involves many stakeholders. (EN: This is the party line from Google, though a great deal of doubt exists that the other stakeholders have much power.)
The Internet has become a powerful part of people's daily lives because it is an open environment in which anyone can operate, which allows for a rapid pace of innovation. The example of Facebook started with a college kid looking for a way to keep in touch with his friends, and it grew from that to a massive force in social networking.
In a closed system, such things cannot happen. This is why the US market lags Japan in mobile - but even Japan is in many ways a "walled garden" - it's just very big and has many gardeners, but there are ultimately limitations to its system. Walled gardens cannot compete with an open system like the Internet, where many can create and compete, which drives innovation.
The Disney group finds mobile "a far more exciting challenge than the PC" - in their view, it offers a screen that is "to big" and the tendency of companies is to fill the space with distractions that detract from the user's experience, which is more focused. (EN: This is said by the interviewer, not Moss, who merely agrees that it is a problem.)
We have still not figured out how to effectively the present capabilities of the mobile platform, particularly the way in which the devices have information about the user and their immediate surroundings. Location-based services are a seen as a major opportunity for mobile, but there is very little development in that area.
Voice-based interfaces have been much neglected as well, and they are a significant are of opportunity for mobile - yet the focus largely remains on the small and clumsy screen and touch interface, as they easily leverage the infrastructure that exists for the Internet medium that developers and designers have established and are attached to.
The short-term goal for Android is to get a "critical mass" of their devices into the market and build a collection of users that are attractive to developers. Once this has been done, they can address the long-term goals, which are "a lot of ubiquity plays" that include not only phones, but non-phone devices that will perform niche tasks (book reader, picture frame, etc.) by using very specific applications that leverage the network. (EN: Seems like flawed thinking to me - they must attract users and will deliver value later, but users will not be attracted if the platform doesn't deliver value now. This problem, and the perspective that creates it, is not unique to Google - many companies won't put fuel into a stove unless somehow starts to make heat without fuel, and if that magically happens, they conclude that they don't need to give it fuel. Such inertia is difficult to overcome, hence the stagnation of the mobile marketplace.)
A contrast is drawn between the single-purpose model (Corkscrew) or the multi-purpose model (Swiss Army knife) - it doesn't necessarily mean that one will win out over the other, but both have their place. If you focus on the needs of the user, the choice becomes clear which to build, and the theoretical argument is entirely irrelevant.
The need for a clean and simple user interface is a critical problem that still needs a solution. Pushing complexity to the user is done when companies fail to solve the problem on the back end, or a lack of focus from a company that does not understand its users needs and thus provides a complicated application that serves a myriad of purposes poorly instead of a few specific needs well.
While Android is presently best known as an operating system for phones and tablets, it originated as an "open" platform that could support any device. It is an ecosystem.
The problem with the traditional approach to closed operating systems is that one company controls it: other firms must plead their case with the OS developer to provide services or fix bugs to make it work with their device or network, wait for them to get around to it, and hope that they don't break it in the next version. An open system can be adopted and modified to suit a device without having to change the standard set of functions encompassed by the system.
The systems are being developed this way because the focus of developers and companies is on their own, specific needs and desires. The software will not be open and collaborative until the companies are open and collaborative - it's a cultural problem that requires a cultural change, not a technical solution.

Jun Yamada (Chapter 3)

The authors interviewed Jun Yamada, chairman and president of Qualcomm in Japan and directed the development of mobile for the company.

From his perspective, the most important contribution of the Japanese market has been the "i-mode" business model, which considered the open structure of the Internet in creating a robust ecosystem for the mobile device, a break-away from the device-specific approach that many players were taking.
One reason western markets failed to achieve an open system is that, from the very start, there was the tendency to break away from standards. Because their devices could not handle HTML, they derived a variety of bastardized versions - CHTML, HDML, and the like - which instead of growing the device capabilities, sought to redefine the standard to accommodate the limitations of the device, and thereby limited the ability to expand the device to its full potential.
A second problem was simple business models: each firm sought to gain the greatest profit for itself, fighting not only its competitors but those companies in their own value chain: the carrier squeezes the manufacturer and the content provider for its own benefit, rather than working cooperatively to achieve mutual benefits. In some markets, content providers have to hand over 50% or more of the gross revenue from their subscribers to the network operator - which "irritated" the content community and made investment in mobile less attractive to entrepreneurs.
The source of both these problems is the extension of the voice-channel model to data services. The business perspective is "our" customers using "our" services on "our" network. Being able to call "their" customers is granted begrudgingly and at a higher cost, and if a problem exists on "their" end it is none of "our" concern - if you can't get a connection to a customer on another network, it's someone else's problem to solve. With data services, customers expect "our" device and network to access "their" services, and when it fails to do so, the customer holds "us" accountable.
The term "smart phone" is a bit ironic, as it is really like the "dumb terminal" of older mainframe technology: it accesses data and services over the network and stores information remotely, on the "cloud" - the struggle between the desire to have data and applications on the device versus accessing it over a network is ongoing, and often moving in the wrong direction - toward proprietary apps rather than open services.
Amazon's Kindle is an example of a technology that is getting it right. All the services are in the cloud - and they are indifferent to the device that runs them. So long as the user can read books and navigate the bookstore, the remote device can be based on any technology platform or operating system.
Ultimately, the mobile industry must be driven by the user's desire to access services through the device, rather than attempting to control the services the user may access or restricting or interfering with the way they use them. This is the mistake device manufacturers and carriers are currently making, often on the premise of protecting the user - but protection and empowerment are inherently at odds with one another.
Consumer preference is currently flexing its muscle in the choice of device. Especially for iPhone and Android, consumers flock to a carrier that provides the device they desire, rather than accepting whatever device the carrier cares to support. When the same power is applied to remote services, carriers will find themselves scrambling to accommodate the users, or lose them.
The industry reaction to device preference this far has been to erect barriers discourage or punish the customer. The carrier refuses to provide customer support for devices it does not prefer or requires a high switchover cost to change devices. The device manufacturer voids the warranty of a device that has been modified to connect to a network it does not prefer. Instead of working toward interoperability, both sides are attempting to crush the customer's desire for it.
This is where government regulations can be useful: to encourage competition and prevent companies from using unfair tactics to limit customer choice.
Power consumption is one of the critical technical hurdles that seems to be getting little public attention: the limited time of a charge and the amount of time it takes to recharge is a source of constant "stress and concern" to the consumer.
Another unglamorous but important hurdle is the matter of interference: being able to have a constant connection that is available everywhere - the fact that there are still locations where access is not available, or barriers such as walls that block access, is a bit embarrassing and inconvenient to the user.
Peer-to-peer networking holds great potential for the consumer, but is perceived as a great threat to the existing carriers, whose power over the customer and justification for profit is in the service of providing connectivity to the network via towers and hotspots that they own. Current technologies like WiFi and Bluetooth aren't up to the job - they are too short-range and fragile and offer too little bandwidth.
Complexity is a problem with the mobile device. Current devices are "almost to difficult to operate." Apple's iPhone has set the bar very high for mobile interface design, and perhaps accessibility is the next area of innovation - while there is not a significant market of individuals with physical handicaps, it is likely that devices designed to accommodate those with limited vision or hearing will provide solutions that contribute to usability for the mass market. Devices such as the RakuRaku phone, designed for senior citizens, provide a glimpse at what can be done to provide limited functionality but high ease of use.

Hiroshi Yoshino (Chapter 3)

The authors interview Hiroshi Yoshino, an executive in the Sony Corporation who has worked in various divisions in Japan and the United States.

Authentication of the individual user is the underlying technology that drives Japan's "osaifu ketai" ("wallet phone") - and because they are used in commercial transactions, generating immediate revenue, this function seems to eclipse all the other possible uses for authentication.
There are many examples, one being the digital key: a person uses their phone to unlock the door to their apartment, and has the ability to send a temporary key to others (a package deliveryman, a maid, etc.) who then can have access without the owner being present to admit them. The use of sensors to monitor activity in the home while absent - to ensure the maid doesn't make off with the silverware - is a necessary companion, but the core of it is authentication of the individual.
This technology hasn't been adequately explored by the Internet, as Internet access is still cumbersome and location-specific. The mobile device, being portable, extends possibilities - like a physical key, it can be conveniently carried around in a person's pocket, which makes the notion more practical.
As such, the mobile device can become the "central hub" in a ubiquitous network - the device carries the credentials the bearer needs to identify themselves and authorize any action, and not just financial ones.
Another example: imagine the mobile device that acts as a remote control for any television, anywhere. The subscriber pays for programming that can be viewed in their living room, in a hotel, in a waiting room, or on the mobile device itself. The location doesn't matter anymore - service is tied to the customer, wherever he happens to be.
A cultural shift has taken place: a decade ago, people took pride in owning a new gadget, showing it off to others - but the novelty has worn off, and people are more interested in the benefit they personally derive from the device rather than the esteem they expect of others. Device ownership has been a distraction from the value of mobile for too long - and as customers look to the benefit rather than the artifact, it creates a greater challenge for providers to actually deliver benefits.
The area of identification and authorization has generally been plagued with security concerns: the ability for a person to gain unauthorized access to your bank account makes many people reluctant to use mobile banking. Even the ability of the bank to track and monitor personal spending behavior is a cause of much "unrealistic anxiety" from consumers who have a blind fear of being tracked and monitored.
One irrational fear is that of losing the cell phone. There is a much higher fear of this than of losing one's wallet - and no statistical evidence that it is any more likely to happen. But even so, the mobile device is more secure than a physical wallet - it is locked and the thief can easily be tracked - and in Japan at least, 60% of lost phones are returned to their owners. Moreover, it is easier to disable a mobile phone and issue a replacement, restoring everything the lost one contained. As such, the fear of losing a phone and having someone else "steal" real money from your accounts is highly unrealistic. The author points to the example of the travelers' check as a similar method of having value that can be cancelled and reissued if it is lost or stolen - though with the concession that it took a lot of marketing to get people to buy into the notion.
"Whenever a new technology is introduced that is truly epoch-making, customers will always be scared or react negatively." There was a panic when Galileo suggested the earth revolved around the sun, and he was even jailed for his discovery, but in the long run, the idea won out. This is likely to be similar in mobile, but the speed at which the idea will recover from the initial shock is expected to be much faster.
The service provider is in a position to "sell" new technology to the consumers and overcome the perception that risk outweighs benefit. In most instances, this is not merely irrational fear: there is little benefit to offset any perceived or imagined risk. The provider must make it useful and usable enough that the benefits are clear, such that people are not easily distracted by fear of the unknown, or area willing to accept a little risk to gain benefits.
Security is necessary, but the customer will not appreciate the subtle difference that makes one technology safer than another. Few customers will insist, "I would like to buy this phone because it uses Type-B RFID." Engineers and programmers think in those terms, but not the general market. All they go upon is the vague notion that it is safe, or not safe.
Even in Japan, the user of mobile wallets has not caught on to the full extent it might: people use it to buy rail tickets, magazines, and soft drinks. They still use credit cards, checks, and even cash for most of their purchases - and will continue to do so until a critical mass of merchants accept wireless payment, and until it is easy for them to set up on their mobile device.
At the same time, the transit environment is particularly well-suited to wireless payment. In that environment, the customer is in a hurry to get from one place to another, and the convenience of wireless payment systems to grab-and-go outweighs the perceived risks, especially given that they are tied to a limited credit line.

Chiaki Fujino (Chapter 4)

Chaki Fujino was president of NANO Media, a company that has two basic lines of business on the mobile platform: developing fan-club sites for entertainers and providing television program listings. There are various other services, such as ringtones, downloading music, mobile "radio," etc.

In looking to user behavior on fan sites, he is surprised at the impact of other media, namely television: when TV commercials promote a given band, they see a surge of people accessing the fan site for that same band, often in real-time when the commercial is aired. They had previously assumed that television's influence had decreased, particularly for younger customers, but this behavior suggests that traditional-media advertising still has a significant impact on consumer behavior.
Video content on the Web is used in both the ways the authors describe in this book. Specifically for sporting events, there is a great deal of short-term viewing sessions during working hours (in-between time zone), and it is assumed those who allow a full game to run are paying intermittent attention to it, much like a TV set in a bar. But most long-term viewing sessions occur in the evenings, when people are presumably at home, watching an entire game with constant attention (golden time zone).
Emergency situations are another key use of mobile video: when an earthquake struck in Tokyo, there was a surge of traffic to news services that provided brief video news segments. Presumably, people in the situation wanted to get a sense of the bigger picture to know what was going on and what they should do, but could not invest significant time in getting the information they needed to take immediate action. This is similar to usage patterns seen in non-emergency situations as well.
"New" ways of using video content are not apparent on mobile simply because most companies are merely reusing video for television on the mobile platform, and it's not surprising that people do not change their consumption pattern. The content is more significant in affecting or accommodating behavior than the device on which it happens to be played. Until this changes, behavior will not change.
It's also notable that the old broadcast model brings with it the notion of the mass market, whereas the mobile device is an individual medium. There is great potential in offering niche media that is highly popular with smaller groups of subscribers.
Mobile also has the untapped potential to change the business model of video content producers, to break away from catering to the mass market and the desire of advertisers to reach an audience defined only by a head-count, to catering to the individual and tapping into the value of marketing to a segmented audience defined by its specific demographics - or top abandon the advertising model and "sell" video directly to the consumer.

(EN: This interview seemed rather shorter than the others, and ended abruptly ... so I suspect this might be incomplete.)

Keisuke Onishi (Chapter 5)

Dr Keisuke Onishi is an academic specializing in path-finding technology, specifically involving road navigation systems, worked with the company that developed the first "multimodal" navigation system for mobile devices, and founded a company that is a leading provider of location-based services in the Japanese market.

Mobile is a natural target for navigation services. While it is possible to plot a course in advance, it is far more valuable to get information in real-time, while in transit.
Their defined target users were males in their twenties and thirties, using their service for business purposes. This was essentially correct, but they also found a significant unexpected market in female users who used the technology in private life, such as meeting friends or finding shops and restaurants. "This came as a surprise."
In terms of the authors' defined "time zones," there is some use of a navigation service during "golden time" to plot a route for future activity or explore conveniences near a destination, but the majority of use is "in-between time" while on the go. Most people are interested in the next leg of their travel, or are seeking things within their immediate area (EN: A previous interviewee suggested it was a one-kilometer radius of present location, suggesting pedestrian travel rather than vehicular.)
It's noted that getting directions in advance is decreasing in favor of getting directions while en route. Largely because mobile devices have increased their capabilities in terms of speed: when a person had to pause in their travel to wait for a map to download, it was less usable. Likewise, the use of location search to find conveniences in the immediate vicinity increased when the mobile device overcame speed limitations.
It's also believed that users will turn to a mobile phone to get location-based information even when there is a PC available, judging by the number of users who access the service from a home or office location. It's clear that mobile is the channel of preference for location-based services. (EN: It's not explained, but I suspect that the ability to pinpoint your present location via GPS saves effort.)
The "carrier menu" has long been an obstacle for third-party services. A service provider would have to negotiate with the carrier to get their application on the menu system - and while it was possible for users to add additional services to their phone, they are not very easy to install and inconvenient to access even when installed. This is beginning to change, as carriers are yielding to the customer's desire for convenient access to the services of their choice rather than accepting the carrier's default menus.
His advice to the western markets is for carriers to stop squeezing the content providers for profit. Ultimately, their profit is derived from customers use of the device and network, which is derived from the value the customer gets from content and service providers. By demanding high commissions, the carriers are gaining short-term profit but stifling innovation that will be better for their long-term profit.
Providing a wealth of services via a simple user interface is a challenge navigation systems face. There are only a few buttons on mobile devices and the keyboard interface is clumsy - it is a disabled and inferior PC-type interface that will never, due to size limitations, be very good. When voice recognition technology becomes reliable, it will be a significant leap forward, enabling users to ask questions verbally and hear the answers, just as if they were speaking to a knowledgeable person over the phone. That is the gold standard of mobile functionality.
Location-based services are also a critical component of the future of mobile. The value of the mobile device is in providing what a person needs in a specific location - if the device can combine the knowledge of the user's location, the location of people and places nearby, and a knowledge of the behavior and preferences of a specific user, it has amazing potential. And this does not seem at all unreasonable to achieve in the near future.

Kenji Kasahara (Chapter 5)

Kenji Kasahara is the founder and CEO of Japan's first social networking service, Mixi. This service began on the Internet, but now 70% of Mixi users access the site from their mobile devices.

Kashahara considers Mixi to have evolved from a social networking service to a platform for other services. Their original intent was personal interaction - profiles, messages, boards, diaries, and the like, but user demand for other functionality led Mixi to leverage other firms, and they have developed their service as a platform that allows any corporation or individual to develop content and services that can be accessible through Mixi service - the ultimate benefit of which is better value to the community, which in turn produces fiercely loyal customers.
Peoples' use of social networking is not easily categorized - looking at the data from millions of users, they found that the usage patterns are highly idiosyncratic and more varied than they had expected.
It's not surprising that social networking flourishes on mobile "because mobile devices were developed as communication devices in the first place," so it's a match to the reason users employ them: to communicate with other people.
Because the mobile device is a constant companion, social interaction is more natural on mobile than on desktop, as the latter is regarded as a machine for doing tasks with data.
In terms of user-generated content, the capabilities of mobile are clumsy and primitive, but the fact that the device is constantly in-hand makes it more convenient.
To be successful in the mobile space requires embracing the characteristics of mobile, in and of itself: simplicity, convenience, and communication.
It's very important for the mobile device to be easy to use. It is popular among people who find a computer too difficult to use, and adding complexity will alienate them. Even for those who can deal with the complexity of the PC, mobile is used in situations and environments where they cannot devote much attention and need a simple way to do simple things.

Tomoko Namba (Chapter 6)

Tomoku Namba is the founder of Mobage-Town, the leading destination site for mobile gaming in the Japanese market, and has been involved with a number of regulatory initiatives in the mobile space.

Prior to getting into the gaming space, her company was involved in auction services, the Japanese equivalent to eBay. What took her attention was that most of the users were mobile-only users who didn't use the Internet, and do not even pay attention to the Web. This is what drew here attention to mobile as a separate platform - not an extension of the Internet, but a thing unto itself. And given the usage statistics, it was more important and had greater potential. And so, focus shifted to mobile, with the Internet being the secondary/ancillary channel for some users.
Even for users who employ both mobile and the PC, there is little overlap. People use different services on the two channels, use them for different purposes, and behave differently in the two different channels. So ultimately, extending one to the other is not a good strategy: you have to approach each in a unique way, because each is used in a unique way.
Simplicity is the key value of mobile - both in terms of ease of use and limited functionality. Users do not what the mobile phone to be as complicated as their personal computer - and they do not what their computer to be as limited as a mobile phone. They are two different tools, used for two different reasons.
Their competitive advantage over larger and more established companies was tat they focused on providing a "good mobile user experience" - the big players merely attempted to move their already-successful Internet services to the mobile platform without taking a mobile-specific design approach.
Social networking is a natural match for mobile - looking at Japan's biggest SNS platforms, about 80% of page-views are on the mobile platform. This is because mobile is with the person at all times. The Internet requires you to be in a specific place, at your computer, in order to communicate with other people - but the need to connect is not limited to time and place: it has to be something you can do anywhere and any time. In that sense, the mobile device is "the perfect tool" for making the data network a real part of the user's life - not something they must withdraw from life to leverage.
The differences between users' needs and behavior in the Japanese market and the American is not so different. Japanese people play games, send messages, manage their finances, etc. and Americans do the same things and have the same needs.
Even so, there are differences. For example, the ability to create and manage an avatar is highly popular in Japan, but when you provide the same feature to Americans, they don't take interest at all: Americans will toy with the feature, but quickly abandon it and even disable it.
In terms of devices, "Japanese phones used to be a lot better than those in the United States, but this may be changing when I look at the iPhone."
The critical aspects of mobile are user interface and timeliness. The mobile user is not in a quiet environment, sitting at a desk with a cup of coffee, and focusing on the task they are doing. The mobile user is in a busy train station, needs a quick bit of information, and doesn't want to be distracted any longer than absolutely necessary to get it. Fast and easy are more important than powerful and extensive.
User-generated content is an area that will grow in importance, though there is a conflict in the ways content is handled - it has exploded, and there's too much of it for a person to find what they want. The two separate solutions are community moderation through tagging, and editorial moderation where one or two knowledgeable individuals evaluate content for relevance. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages, but in the social networking milieu, popularity is more valued than expertise.
The model of the Apple Store is interesting when it comes to distribution of entertainment software - books, music, and movies. This opens up content to the masses, where even an individual who has developed an application, written a novel, or developed a piece of music can compete and publishers do not have the power to filter or restrict choice, and decisions are not driven by what is assumed to be desirable to the market, but what the market actually desires.

Brent Mori (Chapter 6)

Brent Mori is the Japan country manager for Opera Software, which produces multiplatform Web browsers. While Opera has had little success as a desktop browser in the world market, it has a solid presence and has partnered with some of the leading companies in providing cutting-edge technology to the mobile market in Japan.

The concept of "simplexity" is at the heart of what Opera as done with their browser. They have not sought to build a browser that accommodates one platform and one device, but instead to develop a simple technology that can be used across multiple platforms.
Of importance is focusing on more than just displaying content. Consider the Google Docs model - a failure on PC because people have much more powerful word-processing software at their disposal, but with great potential on mobile because the capabilities traditionally provided by onboard applications are now being served remotely. This is critical for mobile due to the low processing power and storage space on such devices.
What Opera has done is similar: users can get great services without having to download and install software on a mobile device - it is not merely a way to display content, but a platform on which applications for displaying and manipulating content can be based.
Ease of use for the user is a critical factor, but ease of implementation for the manufacturer is perhaps equally important: a user cannot use what the manufacturer has not implemented. This is the reason that the Java platform has caught on - "write once run anywhere" is appealing to the manufacturer who does not wish to invest time and resources customizing his hardware and operating system to support specific software applications.
The user interface is also inconsistent among devices, both in terms of hardware and software: the way an application is used on a keyboard differs from how it is used on a touch-screen, and differs from how it is used with a game controller. The user-interface must be customized to the capabilities of the device, not vice-versa.
Ultimately, creating a browser for the mobile platform is about serving the user indirectly, providing the tools that a manufacturer or developer will leverage to serve the user - those who develop services are more concerned with the fundamentals of the interaction rather than the mechanical aspects of interaction, the latter of which are derived from the platform.
The use of "widgets" reflects the degree to which developers need capabilities that are not supported by the Web browser. As the browser becomes more capable, the need for widgets decreases.
The strength of widgets also becomes their weakness, when the developer leverages capabilities specific to one device that cannot be supported, at least not in the same way, on another. Fragmentation is a serious impediment to widget development - an "App" developed for iPhone will not run on non-Apple devices, so the developer must create a separate widget for each platform.
Moreover, manufacturers show little interest in supporting standards. While the consumer wants as much functionality as possible, manufactures want the functionality to be specific to their platform, such that the consumer must buy their device or service if they want it. So fragmentation is in their interest.
At the same time, he agrees with Natsuno (EN: previous interview) in that time and effort being devoted to hashing out standards is taking time and effort away from innovation - creating new content and services consumers will value. Standards are important, in the long run, but we should not wait for standards in order to push forward with new solutions.
Also, standards are always backward-facing: it takes a long time to agree on a standard approach to using today's capabilities - and if it takes several months to define a standard, it is already irrelevant when it is accepted because capabilities have moved onward.
Ideally, a piece of functionality can be written once to run anywhere: on a phone, on a PC, on a gaming station, or a television, etc., regardless of the device's operating system and capabilities. The Web browser provides this neutral space, but in a very limited way presently.
Speed of evolution poses a problem for mobile as an industry: large firms move slowly, while the technology and the demands of the market change quickly. As such, the larger firms who have the ability to provide service to a mass of customers are unable to provide it as quickly as the customers would like, and are reluctant to invest in a technology that may be outdated before they can implement a successful solution.
One noted problem is that a user on a mobile device has far less patience than when they are using a PC - they need a small amount of information quickly because they are doing other things. A technology that is complex requires a number of steps to get to that precise but of information they need within a tiered menu system. As such, service providers' emphasis on making their devices and software "do more" to serve more needs and, presumable, attract more customers, works against them. Mobile and the Internet are two completely different channels and, to be successful, the technology has to be developed to suit the device and the situation in which it is used.
In the present day, "Executives are not thinking about implementation issues, the limitations of the mobile platform, and ultimately how people interact with mobile devices." They are enamored with the future potential of the medium, and do not consider the present needs and capabilities.
The rush to implement capabilities is also done with an eye toward the technology, not toward the user. The companies that do well in the mobile space consider the user and their environment, and instead of rushing forward with a half-baked solution, they consider what is really needed to deliver value to the user and make the necessary arrangements, such as partnering with content and service providers, to deliver it effectively, in release 1.0
That is not to say that mobile is all about limitations. You can't take a computer with you, to get information whenever and wherever you need it - that is a unique value of mobile.
We also see users in the mobile space losing their attachment to consumer brands: the kind of device is secondary to the value it delivers to them, and there is less loyalty to brands that fail to deliver value.

Keisuke Toji (Chapter 6)

Keisuke Toji is an advertising agency executive who grounded the Interactive Program Guide, an information service for television viewers that is one of the most heavily used mobile services in Japan.

Japan is a "TV culture" in which people spend an large amount of their free time watching television and use other channels, such as newspapers and magazines, to get information about programming schedules, so the popularity of the mobile guide is playing to an existing interest. This is likely the reason the service has not caught on in other countries - people do not give as much attention to television or feel as dedicated to the programs they view.
The notion of paid fan-sites for programs didn't catch on: the consumer considers television to be "free" and is not interested in paying for information about programming - the business has to be based on advertising revenue. And since TV has a wide appeal, to most average people and not just the "geek niche," it is sufficiently attractive to advertisers to make that viable.
The difficulties encountered in getting the service off the ground were mainly technical - until the 3G network and larger display screens, it wasn't feasible to deliver a sufficient amount of data to the mobile user in a short enough time and a usable format. Still, companies worked on a solution in advance of the technology because they knew it would be popular.
One of the keys to their success was focusing on the needs of the user rather than the capabilities of the technology - looking at their actual needs and behavior patterns to determine what would be useful, and laying plans to deliver it when the technology was capable of doing so.
Using the infrared port of the mobile device to enable the user to tune their set without having to use a separate remote control was a natural extension, nothing revolutionary - just a matter of recognizing a capability that would be convenient and could be delivered easily. Competitive and advantage customer loyalty is more often the result of providing such small conveniences than elaborately-planned capabilities.
It's unlikely that other countries can duplicate Japan's success because of the structure of their markets: there is competition rather than collaboration among carriers in other markets, making it impossible to deliver a service to a broad array of users.
In the short term, at least, people use different channels in different manners: the television is for passive consumption of video entertainment, the personal computer is for information-intensive tasks, and the mobile device is for quick reference. Viewing video is possible on the PC or Mobile device, but it is generally frustrating and inconvenient, inferior to the TV experience to such a degree that users will switch channels to consumer television entertainment.
Even so, people are generally motivated by convenience. They do not see to use a specific tool, but will use "whatever device they have in front of them" that will accomplish their goals. The strength of mobile is in its constant proximity, and so long as it is not exceedingly inconvenient, people will use it - for the things it is capable of doing fairly well.
For television particularly, it is a device designed for consuming video entertainment, and it is exceedingly good for that purpose. It is, however, quite clumsy as an interaction device and will likely continue to be so. People don't use set-top boxes to read and send e-mail messages, even though they have been capable of doing so for years, and it's unlikely this will change.
While video can be delivered to the computer or mobile device, it is a secondary channel for entertainment consumption. If it is not possible to use a television, people will make do with their mobile device - but it's unlikely it will become the primary channel of consumption because it's simply not good for it.
It's noted that streaming video over the Internet to a PC has been possible for many years as well, but the practice did not gain popularity until it was possible to use a set-top box to view video on a television screen rather than a computer monitor.
The process of finding a program to watch or scheduling a recording is a data-specific task that requires the user to see a large matrix of information indicating programming schedules, and a lot of information about an individual show or series. This kind of task is best accommodated by the PC. While mobile cannot match the breadth of information a PC can provide, it is more convenient - so in a mobile programming guide, people are accepting a compromise of richness for convenience. Since television viewing is a leisure activity, it's likely this is an acceptable compromise - and usage statistics for the mobile programming guide bear this out.
Simplicity is also an important factor. The notion of a television programming guide is already well known, as people have seen and used them in the print medium. The electronic version is not something new that they must learn how to use - they can dive right in and get value of it, and learn to leverage the additional features at their own convenience - or even ignore the features and still get good value from the experience. Innovation is not doing entirely new things, but in providing a more conveniently way of doing familiar things in a way that is already known, such that the channel-switch is seamless and comfortable.
On the other hand, television itself is becoming more complex: then they began the electronic guide, there were seven main channels in Japan. Now, there are over 300. it's not merely a task of finding what program you want from a limited number of choices, but learning about new programs you may be unaware of and whose names you do not recognize. The digital guide facilitates this in a way that a paper guide cannot - but in this case, the digital guide is a solution to a phenomenon that itself is more complicated, which makes it all the more important for the solution to be simple.

Tetsuzo "Ted" Matsumoto (Chapter 7)

Tetsuzo Matsumoto is presently a vice president with Softbank, and previously worked in Qualcomm Japan in developing strategy for mobile markets, with particular focus on developing economies, and has served on the boards of 15 Japanese media firms.

The young Japanese users were the key to the adoption of mobile in Japan: they created a "new culture" in which mobile handsets became an indispensable tool. Youth is a key component in introducing anything innovative - they are more inclined to explore possibilities rather than sticking to traditional ways of doing things, and more likely to experiment with fads. This is not distinctly Japanese - "kids are kids wherever you go" and cultural differences do not become evident or deeply ingrained until college age - though it may be perceived as more dramatic in a place such as Japan, where tradition is so deeply revered in the culture.
One difference between Japanese and American culture is that Japanese live in a pedestrian environment, with Americans live in an automotive culture. Europeans seem to be somewhere in the middle.
Another difference is that Americans are more individualistic - doing "your own thing" is valued, whereas the Japanese are more of a "me-too" culture, where people seek to do what other people are doing. Japanese are slow to make independent decisions and quick to follow the herd, which explains why trends catch fire so quickly, and fade just as quickly, on a much larger scale.
It's also atypical that Japanese children have considerable economic autonomy: parents tend to spoil children and give them whatever they want, more so than in other cultures. So when a "me-too" trend catches on, they are financially able to join in quickly and create a significant market.
There is also the perception in western markets that companies and industries drive the consumer market, whereas in Japan, they understand that consumers drive the market - that is, a business does not create word-of-mouth, but responds to it. And consumers are more ready to adopt what is exciting and new rather than what is proven and efficient.
Ironically, business users in Japan are behind their overseas peers: they do not adopt technology as quickly, and have greater concerns about the security of corporate data. However, it's expected that they will eventually catch up.
The iPhone poses a serious threat to domestic carriers in Japan. It's a major leap forward, even considering that Japanese handsets have long been ahead of Western models. The "smart phone" in general, with a simple touch interface and a larger screen, is much more flexible and sophisticated, and can have applications in both consumer and business markets. The interviewer asks why a Japanese firm doesn't simply make a smart phone, but Matsumoto simply replies "I do not know. You are asking the question to the wrong person."
One of the most critical elements for the future of mobile is screen size - but you run into a problem in that making the screen much larger makes the device impractical to use in one hand. It's likely the solution to this is the ability to push data to an auxiliary screen that is occasionally used, when it is desired. The same is true of the phones that connect to a full-size keyboard that can be used on occasions where the user wishes to enter a lot of text. When that is possible, the mobile phone becomes a competitor to the personal computer, in that it can be used in both ways.
The Japanese model has not spread to the world, simply because of the mind-set of Japanese business. They are very conservative, and want to "perfect" their technology in the domestic market before venturing abroad. By the time they are ready, the technology has moved forward, or foreign firms have filled the demand in their domestic markets. There are few occasions and few product categories in which the Japanese have bee able to successfully deliver their products to the global market.
The most exciting area of innovation presently is service-content delivery systems, such as Apple's App store, which enables the user to choose from a huge variety of niche applications with ease. The next step forward is for the handset to become a more sophisticated "servant" of the user, using data about the environment and the user so that it can more intelligently find and make available what is needed, rather than placing the onus on the user to find the right app.
There is also great potential in seeking to sever the particular needs of very specific segments. The focus is presently on mass markets, creating a single service that has mass appeal to many users, but both device manufacturers and application programmers are showing some interest in providing high-value services to smaller audiences with specific needs.
His best advice to the young entrepreneur is to consider the behavior of people rather than the capabilities of the gadget. If you can develop a mobile application that enables people to do things they are already doing in other channels, you have a better chance of gaining popularity and taking leadership, rather than trying to compete with more established firms.
The opportunity many large firms are missing, as obvious as it seems, are applications designed for situations in which the user is mobile - that is, when they are outside of the user's home or office and need to perform a simple task.

JIM.SHAMLIN.COM

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